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Overbidding in auctions has been attributed to e.g. risk aversion, loser regret, level-
k, and cursedness, relying on varying identifying assumptions. I argue that “type
projection” organizes these findings and largely captures observed behavior. Type
projection formally models that people tend to believe others have object values sim-
ilar to their own—a robust psychological phenomenon that naturally applies to auc-
tions. First, I show that type projection generates the main behavioral phenomena
observed in auctions, including increased sense of competition (“loser regret”) and
broken Bayesian updating (“cursedness”). Second, re-analyzing data from seven ex-
periments, I show that type projection explains the stylized facts of behavior across
private and common value auctions. Third, in a structural analysis relaxing the iden-
tifying assumptions made in earlier studies, type projection consistently captures
behavior best, in-sample and out-of-sample. The results reconcile bidding patterns
across conditions and have implications for behavioral and empirical analyses as
well as policy.
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1 Introduction
The false consensus bias is the tendency to assume that one’s own opinions, preferences
and values are typical and shared by others. Following Ross et al. (1977), such “projec-
tion” has been confirmed in many experiments (Mullen et al., 1985) and shown to per-
sist even if subjects are provided with factually contradicting information (Krueger and
Clement, 1994). Thus, projection is of intuitive relevance in all choices under incomplete
information—not just in the non-strategic environments on which the psychological liter-
ature traditionally focuses, but also in strategic interactions. Existing studies of projection
in “games” focus on games with one-sided incomplete information. Loewenstein et al.
(2003) study projection of utility onto future selves, finding that it explains anomalies in
purchases of durable goods, and Madarász (2012) studies projection of information from
an informed player to an uninformed one, which explains the hindsight bias in agency
problems. The present paper provides a comprehensive analysis of projection in a class
of games with two-sided incomplete information, auctions.
Auctions are widely analyzed games with two-sided incomplete information about
individual object values. I introduce a model of type projection where players may over-
estimate the probability that their opponents share their type—i.e. their signal about the
object value—ranging from zero projection (the original Bayesian case) to full projection
(disregarding all prior information).1 The degree of projection is denoted by ρ ∈ [0,1]. In
equilibrium, players anticipate their opponent types’ actual strategies, but overestimating
the probability that opponents share their type, they perceive competition to be fiercer
than it is and they wrongly update their estimate of the object value conditional on win-
ning. This generates the behavioral phenomena observed in bidding across conditions,
and based on my theoretical and econometric analysis, I argue that type projection, as
predicted by a host of psychological evidence, captures bidding fairly comprehensively
and substantially better than existing models.
The basic idea is simple. Type-projecting bidders project their signals about the ob-
ject value. This builds on psychological evidence showing that object values indeed are
projected, e.g. in bargaining (Bottom and Paese, 1999; Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001)
and in consumption decisions (Frederick, 2012; Kurt and Inman, 2013). As for auctions,
consider bidding to buy a house. Projecting bidders neglect competitors whose values are
vastly inferior, against whom they surely win, and competitors whose values are vastly
superior, against whom they surely lose. They focus on competitors with similar values,
trying to ensure winning against them. This focus increases the sense of competition
and obscures the perceived value distribution. The former induces overbidding in any
first-price auction, essentially to avoid “loser regret”, and the latter weakens Bayesian
updating in any common value auction (the Winner’s Curse).
That is, the robust psychological finding of (type) projection already implies the main
behavioral phenomena in auctions, and in addition, it correctly predicts a number of more
subtle findings that are incompatible with existing models. For example, in private value
auctions, projecting bidders overbid as they overestimate the share of opponents with
similar values. They outbid them to increase the probability of winning. In contrast, risk
1Full projection is regularly considered in analyses of social preferences. The present paper consid-
ers the more intricate case of imperfect projection. Allowing for imperfect projection is critical, as full
projection is neither observed in psychology nor fits bidding in auctions.
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aversion emphasizes a trade-off between increasing winning probability and increasing
conditional profit. Following Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), the former relates to loser
regret (regret of losers if they could have won profitably) and the latter relates to winner
regret (regret of winners if they could have won with lower bids). Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay
(2007) find that subjects do not trade off these regrets but focus on loser regret. This
focus contradicts risk aversion and is implied by type projection. At the individual level,
I find that subjects randomize consistently and use left-skewed mixed strategies, which
also contradicts risk aversion and is predicted by type projection equilibrium.
Analyzing common value auctions, I similarly find that subjects randomize consis-
tently and that they overbid more with common values than with private values. Again,
both observations are implied by type projection and not implied by existing models such
as risk aversion or cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005).2 This range of obser-
vations uniquely predicted by type projection, and considering that projection is a robust
phenomenon known to affect behavior under incomplete information, raises the question
to which degree projection can be considered a robust, potentially comprehensive expla-
nation of bidding in auctions.3 To answer this question, I conduct a structural analysis of
data from seven experiments. The data set forms the union of the data sets analyzed in
seminal structural analyses of bidding, which limits data selection effects in favor of type
projection. In addition, merging multiple data sets allows me to assess whether models
are precise (in-sample) and reliable (out-of-sample).
Both features are desirable in behavioral and empirical analysis, but reliability will
be of particular relevance here. To clarify, let me briefly review existing results. Goeree
et al. (2002b) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2005) show that risk aversion captures bidding
in private value auctions, Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok (2007) observe loser regret, Eyster and Rabin (2005) observe cursedness in com-
mon value auctions, and Crawford and Iriberri (2007) observe limited depth of reasoning
in either condition. That is, the results vary enormously between studies. The main rea-
son appears to relate to the identifying assumptions on strategic beliefs, which range from
naive beliefs (level-1) over Nash beliefs (equilibrium without anticipating errors) to ratio-
nal expectations. To reconcile these results, such specific assumptions on belief formation
should therefore be avoided. I introduce a concept based on quantal response equilibrium
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) that nests the three belief models above and endogenizes
the assumption on belief formation. While this solves one problem, Haile et al. (2008)
suspect that generalized forms of QRE may overfit and lack robustness themselves. The
data used here allow me to directly address this issue by evaluating robustness, i.e. the
2Cursed bidders believe their opponents get random signals with probability χ and the true signals with
1−χ. Type projecting bidders believe their opponents have signals similar to their own with probability ρ
and the true signals with probability 1−ρ. In both cases, bidders underestimate the informativeness of their
opponents’ bids about the object value and experience the Winner’s Curse, which captures the intuition
usually expressed by economists (e.g. Milgrom, 1989), but between the two approaches, only the belief
perturbation underlying type projection is supported by independent psychological evidence. This evidence
(on false consensus) draws from interactions with symmetric type sets, and in turn, cursed equilibrium
appears more appropriate to model games with asymmetric type sets (e.g. buyer-seller interactions).
3There is evidence that preferences due to e.g. spite influence behavior in second-price private-value
auctions (Cooper and Fang, 2008), as discussed below. In this sense, projection cannot be fully compre-
hensive, naturally. In my analysis, I focus on projection in relation to concepts used in structural analyses
of bidding, namely risk aversion, cursedness and limited depth of reasoning.
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accuracy of predictions across experiments.4 In addition, this analysis verifies whether
the models are applicable across data sets, e.g. in (future) analyses of different data.
The results corroborate the compatibility with psychological intuition and stylized
facts. Type projection indeed captures behavior well, both descriptively (in-sample) and
in particular predictively (out-of-sample). Further, inexperienced subjects tend to under-
estimate the rationality of others, though not in the way predicted by level-k. As subjects
gain experience, their beliefs approach rational expectations, the precision in maximizing
utility increases, subject heterogeneity becomes significant, and yet, the degree of projec-
tion remains largely constant (around 0.5). Thus, type projection appears to be a robust
facet of behavior, and in the analyzed auctions, it is comprehensive in the sense that nei-
ther risk aversion nor cursedness capture facets of behavior incompatible with projection.
The results have policy implications, as the projection bias is reduced when subjects are
educated explicitly (Engelmann and Strobel, 2012), which enables efficiency gains, and
they have implications for behavioral and empirical work. For, type projection intuitively
factors in all symmetric Bayesian games, and thus needs to be controlled for in analyses
of social preferences under anonymity (for related evidence, see Blanco et al., 2014), and
as it fits robustly across private and common values, it promises to capture field auctions
which tend to be hybrid (Haile, 2001; Goeree and Offerman, 2002).
Section 2 introduces the model of type projection and analyzes type projection in auc-
tions. Section 3 introduces the data sets and evaluates type projection’s basic predictions.
Section 4 contains the structural analysis of bidding. Section 5 concludes. The appendix
contains technical material, the supplementary material provides robustness checks.
2 Type projection in auctions
2.1 Definition
There are n symmetric bidders, denoted as i ∈ N = {1,2, . . . ,n}, and each bidder gets a
signal x ∈ [x,x]. Signals may be correlated. A bidder’s expectation of the object value
conditional on signal x is v(x), the expectation conditional on both the own signal x and
the highest opponent signal y is v(x,y). The density of the highest opponent signal y
conditional on the own signal x is fY (y|x). A pure strategy b⋆ is a function mapping
signals x to bids b ∈R. The expected payoff of bidding b ∈R, conditional on own signal
x and in response to the opponents’ bidding function b⋆, is
Π0(b|b⋆,x) = E
[









The symmetric, pure BNE satisfies b⋆(x) ∈ argmaxb Π0(b|b⋆,x) for all signals x. Note
that I refer to the expected payoff in this case of zero projection as Π0.
4Another issue with using the generalization of QRE is that the underlying QRE needs to be com-
puted explicitly—the fixed point computation cannot be avoided using the insight of Bajari and Hortacsu
(2005), by exploiting rational expectations, as relaxing rational expectations is exactly the point. The ex-
plicit computation of QREs is computationally demanding in standard auctions, due to the complexity of
randomized bidding functions, but a novel observation allows me to reduce the strategy complexity by an
order of magnitude and thus enables computation of QREs using massive parallelization (on GPUs).
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Type-projecting bidders partially replace the objective information about the type dis-
tribution, weight 1−ρ with ρ ∈ [0,1], by their projection that all bidders’ types are equal
to the own type, weight ρ. The parameter ρ is called degree of projection. First consider
the case of full projection ρ = 1. In this case, the expected payoff of bidding b is







where s(b,b⋆,x) denotes the fully projecting bidder’s share of the prize contingent on
bidding b: s = 0 if b < b⋆(x), s = 1/n if b = b⋆(x), and s = 1 if b > b⋆(x). Now, given the
assumption that the projection has weight ρ, the expected payoff is simply the weighted
mean of “objective” payoff Π0(b|b⋆,x) and “projected” payoff Π1(b|b⋆,x), i.e.
Πρ(b|b⋆,x) = (1−ρ)Π0(b|b⋆,x)+ρΠ1(b|b⋆,x). (3)
The symmetric, pure ρ–Type Projection Equilibrium (ρ-TPE), with ρ ∈ [0,1], satisfies
b⋆(x) ∈ argmaxb Πρ(b|b⋆,x) for all signals x.
This model provides a simple and tractable formulation of type projection in auctions.
To clarify this, let me briefly describe how the model could be generalized or adapted.
The tractability follows from two assumptions. On the one hand, bidders project their
types onto all their opponents simultaneously. Alternatively, one might assume that bid-
ders project their types independently onto their various opponents. The resulting model
of projection appears to be qualitatively rather similar to the above model. Besides im-
proving tractability, correlated projection captures the observation that individuals tend
to believe their opponents make correlated choices.5 On the other hand, bidders project
their exact type. In Bayesian games with ordered type sets, bidders might instead believe
that the opponents are of “similar” rather than “equal” types. Such a model of “fuzzy
projection” may be more descriptive in specific circumstances, but the simpler model of
exact projection applies to both ordered and unordered type sets, and it avoids the free
parameters in defining distance functions. Its parsimony seems particularly desirable in
the present analysis of the basic implications of type projection.
2.2 Related literature
Psychology Much evidence suggests that individuals assume the own opinions, pref-
erences and values are shared by others. This phenomenon is labeled projection bias or
false consensus. Ross et al. (1977) showed that subjects’ beliefs about others’ choices
correlate with their own choices, and that their beliefs about others’ characteristics corre-
late with their own. Projection biases behavior in relation to the rational benchmark, but
it actually seems helpful in predicting characteristics of other individuals. Hoch (1987)
finds that the majority of individuals tend not to use available information and would
actually improve their predictions if they weighted their own positions even stronger.
A large number of studies subsequently showed that individuals project object values
and preferences (both labeled “types” in Bayesian games) onto others, suggesting that
5See Camerer et al. (2004), Costa-Gomes et al. (2009), and Breitmoser (2012). Let me refer to the
literature on “clustering illusion” in psychology for further discussion.
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type projection likely matters in auctions and thus affects bidding. Individuals project
values such as their willingness to pay (Frederick, 2012; Kurt and Inman, 2013) and their
reservation prices (Bottom and Paese, 1999; Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001). Individ-
uals also project preferences and strategies onto opponents in strategic games such as
the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (Messé and Sivacek, 1979), public goods games (Offer-
man et al., 1996), and distribution games including dictator, public goods, and ultimatum
games (Blanco et al., 2011, 2014). Further, Iedema and Poppe (1995) and e.g. Aksoy and
Weesie (2012) show that individuals project their social value orientation, and Bellemare
et al. (2011) find preference projection with respect to guilt aversion.6
More generally, projection is strongest in relation to people similar to oneself (Clement
and Krueger, 2002), and in auctions, bidders arguably consider each other similar, as they
are interested in buying the same object. Mullen et al. (1985) show that projection occurs
robustly, persisting even if subjects are provided with information factually contradicting
their projection (“truly false consensus”, Krueger and Clement, 1994). Engelmann and
Strobel (2000, 2012) show that in order for the projection bias to disappear, the objec-
tive information must be handed to subjects on a “silver platter” and it must be usable
at very low cognitive costs. Hence, the background information provided to subjects in
laboratory auctions, about the abstract type distributions, is likely not obstructive to their
projection of values and preferences.7 In field auctions, no objective information about
the opponents’ values is provided at all, suggesting projection is likely even stronger,
and in this sense, analyzing laboratory auctions, we will observe a lower bound for the
relevance of projection in auctions in general.
Related models Type projection distinctly differs from existing models of projection.
Let me start with Loewenstein et al. (2003), who consider a decision maker predicting his
own utility in future states of the world. Given consumption c and current state s, the de-
cision maker predicts the utility to be (1−α)u(c,s′)+αu(c,s), α ∈ [0,1], in alternative
state s′. The main difference between type projection and such “utility projection” ma-
terializes in strategic games (such as auctions). Since each type plays a distinct strategy,
a type-projecting player associates each list of opponents’ types t−i with mixed strate-
gies—with probability 1−ρ the true types t−i play and with probability ρ the projected
types play. In turn, utility projection implies that players believe their opponents’ types
have “averaged” utilities and thus play pure strategies each.8
6Additional evidence shows projection of preferences and beliefs onto future selves. Gilbert et al.
(1998) show that individuals overestimate the duration of affective reactions to negative events, Read and
Van Leeuwen (1998) show that individuals project their current state of appetite when ordering meals in
advance, Conlin et al. (2007) show that individuals project their current preferences analyzing catalog
orders, Simonsohn (2010) observe preference projection in college enrollment decisions, via the cloud
cover observed on visiting day, Grable et al. (2004), Grable et al. (2006), and Kliger and Levy (2008) show
that projection in reaction to stock market price changes explain investment decisions.
7Engelmann and Strobel (2012) suggest the information about the opponents’ signals contained in
winning the auction is implicit and therefore likely neglected by bidders, not being handed on a silver
platter. They argue that this may help explain imperfect Bayesian updating and thus the Winner’s curse
in CV auctions. My model of projection indeed implies (and in this sense explains) such negligence and
imperfect updating in CV auctions, and additionally it explains overbidding (loser regret) in private value
auctions which does not relate to negligence of the information contained in winning.
8Also note the difference to the notion of “strategy” projection: A type projecting player believes
opponents share his type but keep their individual incentives. Both utility projecting and strategy projecting
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An information projecting player (Madarász, 2012) believes his opponents know all
he knows, in addition to their existing knowledge. In auctions, information projection im-
plies I believe the opponents know my values, in addition to knowing their own values.
Type projection assumes instead that the opponents share i’s value. Information projec-
tion is appealing in cases of one-sided “missing” information, and it provides an intrigu-
ing explanation of the hindsight bias, but it appears less appealing in auctions—where
there is no objectively “missing” information, but simply differences in types (values).9
Cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) is related in that it also assumes players
correctly anticipate their opponent types’ strategies but misperceive the type distribu-
tion. Type projection explicitly implements the projection bias as defined in psychology,
that people project their own traits or opinions, which captures evidence from interac-
tions with ex-ante symmetric type sets (such as auctions). In turn, cursed equilibrium
appears more appropriate to capture beliefs if type sets are clearly asymmetric, as re-
sult of which projection of the own type appears less intuitive. Market interactions with
one-sided incomplete information as analyzed in Eyster and Rabin (2005) appear to be a
prototypical example of a Bayesian game that is more intuitively captured by cursed equi-
librium. A concept inverting the idea of cursed equilibrium is the level-k model as ap-
plied to auctions by Crawford and Iriberri (2007). Contrary to cursed equilibrium, where
strategies are correct but perceived types are random, level-k assumes types are correct
but perceived strategies are random. The predictions are rather similar (see Crawford
and Iriberri, 2007). Finally, analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel and Koessler,
2008) also captures the idea that the perceived type distribution is wrong, in that types
are bundled into analogy classes and thus perceived to be coarser than they actually are.
This biases Bayesian updating in common value auctions, without affecting behavior in
(typical) private value auctions, similarly to level-k and cursed equilibrium.
2.3 Theoretical framework
Type projection induces a form of loser regret in first-price auctions and conservatism in
belief revision about common values. The former induces overbidding in relation to the
Bayesian benchmark, while the latter may induce over- or underbidding, depending on
signal structure.10 In order to provide a unified treatment of both private and common
value auctions, i.e. to clarify the main predictions most transparently, I will focus on cases
where these two forces point into the same direction. Alternative cases can be analyzed
similarly, as illustrated in the supplementary material.
Both loser regret and conservatism induce overbidding if winning constitutes “bad
news” and the environment exhibits strategic complementarity. “Bad news” are implied
if the object value conditional on just winning is smaller than the unconditional object
players implicitly assume the opponents neglect their original incentives and adopt his utilities or strategies.
9Madarász (2015) generalizes the concept by including “ignorance projection” and applies it to games
with two-sided incomplete information. The differences still appear major, as information projection ap-
pears to predict pure equilibria in auctions (since payoffs are continuous), but precise comparisons are
impossible, as the shape of equilibrium strategies under information projection in auctions (which are not
the main application) is not characterized (see Example 2.1.2 in Madarász, 2015).
10An example for underbidding in CV auctions is the “wallet game” (Avery and Kagel, 1997) where
the object value is the sum of the bidders’ signals. Conservatively updating bidders underbid the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium if they have got high signals. An analysis of such auctions is provided in the supplement.
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value. Strategic complementarity obtains if the more aggressive my opponents bid, the
more aggressive I should bid, which in common value auctions depends on how “bad”
the bad news are. For, the more aggressive the opponents bid, the worse are their signals
in the case I am winning, and the lower is the object value conditional on winning. As a
result of this “information effect”, the best response declines in the opponents’ bids. This
information effect may dominate the general incentive to match the aggressiveness of the
opponents’ bids, and then strategic complementarity is violated (Klemperer, 1998).
For the purpose of a unified analysis, I analyze an environment exhibiting a weak
form of strategic complementarity: one’s best response is not declining in the opponents’
bids. Relaxing this assumption would leave most statements made below unchanged, but
the lower bound of equilibrium bids cannot be characterized tightly, as overbidding is not
generally predicted (the wallet game is the pathological example where over- and under-
bidding may result, depending on one’s signal). Weak strategic complementarity obtains
in the canonical auctions with either affiliated private values (APV) or common values
(CV) analyzed in experiments (Kagel and Levin, 1986; Kagel et al., 1987). I analyze a
generalized information structure containing these two auctions as special cases.
Definition 1 (Hybrid first-price auctions). X0 is uniform on [X0,X0], and for all bidders
i, the private signals Xi conditional on X0 are uniform on [X0 − ε,X0 + ε] with ε > 0. The
bidder’s object values are vi = δ Xi+(1−δ) X0, with δ∈ [0,1], and δ= 1 in APV auctions
and δ = 0 in CV auctions. The winners pay their bids.
The pure common value case (δ = 1) is the borderline case where one’s best response
is independent of the opponents’ strategy, i.e. the two effects exactly cancel out. The case
of independent private values (IPV) is qualitatively similar to APV in many ways, but the
notation of mixed strategies needs to be modified, obfuscating a joint discussion.
We will find that all ρ-TPEs are mixed in these auctions, which is relevant, as mixed
equilibria must be analyzed under a curse of dimensionality. In contrast to pure strategy
equilibria, it is not sufficient to focus on the opponent with the highest signal anymore.
Bidders with lower signals may also place the winning bid and thus must be considered
explicitly in the analysis. Accounting for this is in principle straightforward, but tedious
without offering any obvious additional insights. For ease of exposition, I therefore focus
on auctions with two bidders, which suffices to the clarify the main insights.
Without projection, the approximate BNE bids are b⋆ ≈ x− ε in CV auctions (δ = 0)
and b⋆ ≈ x− ε · 2/n in APV auctions (δ = 1). There are small distortions if x is close
to the bounds of the signal space, but as in most structural analysis of auctions, I will
abstract from these distortions.11 Theoretically, this is adequate only if the difference
between the bidders’ signals D = X −Y is independent of one’s signal X .
Assumption 1. Consider a two bidder auction with the signals x and y of the bidders.
The distribution of D = X −Y is independent of X , has density fD and support [d,d].
Example 1. In the hybrid first-price auctions, D = X −Y is triangular on [d,d] =
[−2ε,2ε] and independent of X if X ∈ [X0 + ε,X0 − ε].
11For example, in CV auctions, the exact BNE strategy is b(xi) = xi − ε+Y with Y = 2εn+1 × exp
{
−
n(xi − x− ε)/2ε
}
, but Y ≈ 0 if the signal xi is not very close to the bounds of the signal space.
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For example, in the common value auction of Kagel and Levin (1986) where the
common value X0 is uniform on [50,500] and individual signals Xi are independently
uniform on [X0−10,X0+10], independence obtains in the eyes of i if 60 ≤ Xi ≤ 490, i.e.
with a probability near 1. Independence is thus valid in the interior of the signal space and
abstracts from distortions induced by the signal space bounds—which in turn allows us to
focus on the strategic aspects in bidding.12 Specifically, Assumption 1 allows us to focus
on “normalized” bids without loss of generality, i.e. on bids normalized in relation to
the signal. Given signal x, the own normalized bid is r = b(x)− x, and correspondingly,
the opponent’s normalized bid is r⋆ = b⋆(y)− y. Normalized bids express the “degree
of bid shading”, i.e. the amount by which the bidders undercut their signals x and y,
respectively. Similarly, the normalized expected object value is ṽ(d) := v(x,x+d)−x and
the normalized unconditional object value is Ṽ =
∫ d
d ṽ(d) fD(d)dd, both with d = y− x
and fD as defined in Assumption 1. The normalized values express the difference between
expected object value and signal. Given these normalizations, the normalized expected








The auction is fully characterized by the duple 〈ṽ, fD〉, and thus, if Assumption 1 is satis-
fied and the opponent’s normalized bid r⋆ is independent of x, then one’s best response is
also independent of x. Hence, any equilibrium in normalized bids that are independent of
x must correspond with an equilibrium of the original auction, and using uniqueness of
BNE, this implies that we can focus on normalized bids that are independent of x without
loss of generality. This theoretical prediction, that normalized strategies are independent
of x, will also be tested (and confirmed) econometrically below.
Example 2. In the hybrid first-price auctions, ṽ(d) = δ ·0+(1−δ) ·d/2 for all δ ∈ [0,1]
and all d ∈ [−2ε,2ε], the unconditional value is Ṽ = 0, and the normalized BNE without
projection is r⋆ =−ε (independently of δ) in two-bidder auctions.
As illustration, recall that the BNE bids are b⋆ = x− ε and b⋆ = x− ε · 2/n in case
of δ = 1 and δ = 0, respectively, implying that the normalized BNE bids are r⋆ = −ε
and b⋆ =−ε ·2/n, respectively. In equilibrium, the normalized bid r⋆ is negative and the
expected normalized payoff is positive. Also note that the unconditional object value is
normalized to zero and BNE strategy normalized to r⋆ =−ε for all instances of the hybrid
value structure in the two-bidder case. This facilitates the unified analysis of APV and
CV auctions. Finally, the normalization reduces the dimensionality of the strategy space,
from analyzing equilibria in bidding functions to analyzing equilibria in scalar degrees of
bid shading. This enables econometric analyses of mixed strategies as discussed below.
2.4 Analysis of projection in auctions
Let R ⊂ R denote the set of normalized strategies r. A mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆R is the
density of a distribution on R. The expected (normalized) payoff of bidding r in response
12“Independence” in this sense is violated for independent private values, which prevents a joint analysis.
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Under full projection, bidders assume that their opponent’s signal equates with theirs,
implying they do not learn anything new when winning the auction. Hence, the object
value conditional on winning equates with the unconditional object value, Ṽ , and the









fD(d) ·Fσ(r)dd = (Ṽ − r) ·Fσ(r) (6)
Under ρ-projection, the expected payoff is again the weighted average of zero projection
payoffs Π̃0 and full projection payoffs Π̃1.
Π̃ρ(r|σ) = (1−ρ)Π̃0(r|σ)+ρ(Ṽ − r)Fσ(r) (7)
A mixed ρ-TPE σ satisfies r ∈ argmaxr′ Π̃ρ(r′|σ) if and only if σ(r) > 0, for almost all
r ∈ R. To characterize these equilibria, let Sσ = {r ∈ R|σ(r) > 0} denote the support of
strategy σ, with bounds r = infSσ and r = supSσ. The following proposition establishes
mixedness, overbidding, and skewness in all hybrid first-price auctions, assuming ρ ∈
(0,1). In the limiting cases ρ = 0 and ρ = 1, pure equilibria obtain.
Proposition 1. Consider a two-bidder hybrid first-price auction. For any ρ ∈ (0,1), any
symmetric ρ-TPE strategy is mixed, its support satisfies rBNE ≤ r < r ≤ Ṽ (overbidding),
and the density is monotonically increasing on its support (left-skewness).
The proof is relegated to the appendix. In the following, I focus on the underlying
intuition.13 Figure 1 plots the predictions of type projection in APV and CV auctions,
alongside those of risk aversion in APV auctions and cursedness in CV auctions.14 The
predictions are plotted for logit equilibria as analyzed in the econometric analysis be-
low, which illustrates that the predicted bounds and shape of the equilibrium strategies
are robust to (small) logit errors. Both risk aversion and cursedness predict symmetric
distributions, while type projection predicts left-skewed strategies.
Overbidding to avoid loser regret Let w0(r|r⋆) denote the probability of winning
without projection, and wρ(r|r⋆) denote the respective probability with ρ-projection. If
the projecting bidder bids less than opponents with the same signal, r < r⋆, he underesti-
mates the probability of winning, as wρ(r|r⋆)= (1−ρ)w0(r|r⋆)+ρ ·0 is then less than the
objective probability w0(r|r⋆). If he bids more than opponents with the same signal, he
overestimates the probability of winning, as wρ(r|r⋆) = (1−ρ)w0(r|r⋆)+ρ ·1>w0(r|r⋆)
13Throughout, I abstract from discussing existence, as existence can be established straightforwardly
for finite games, and symmetric auctions seem to be representable as the limit of finite games similarly to
symmetric Bertrand competition (as opposed to asymmetric Bertrand competition).
14Risk aversion does not affect equilibrium predictions in common value auctions and cursedness does
not affect predictions in private value auctions. Hence, the corresponding plots are skipped.
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Figure 1: Projection predicts skewed overbidding in both APV and CV auctions. Risk
aversion and cursedness predict symmetric overbidding in APV and CV, respectively
(a) APV: Projection ρ


































(b) APV: Risk aversion α


































(c) CV: Projection ρ




























(d) CV: Curse χ






























results then. This induces an incentive to outbid opponents with the same signal, in all
information conditions. These incentives resemble loser regret (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay,
2007), i.e. to feel regret if a higher bid would have won the auction profitably. Projecting
bidders act as if they felt “conditional loser regret”, i.e. regret if a higher bid would have
won the auction against opponents with the same valuation. The differences are minor,
as loser regret materializes only if the opponents’ values are similar. Thus, I will say that
projection induces loser regret as observed by Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007).15
Cursed value perception If one outbids opponents with the same signal, i.e. if r > r⋆,
the expected object value under projection is equal to the expectation under cursedness
(assuming ρ = χ), a weighted average of conditional and unconditional value. Alterna-
tively, if r < r⋆, the projected expectation equates with the Bayesian expectation. That is,
the projected expectation is biased only if one outbids opponents with the same value. In
standard common value auctions, the bias is an upward bias, i.e. the object value is over-
estimated, and the projected expectation exhibits an upward jump at b = b⋆(x). Besides
inducing cursed object valuations, this increment of the expectation adds to the loser re-
gret. Thus, the incentives of projecting bidders to outbid opponents with the same signal
are particularly strong in common value auctions. On a qualitative basis, type projection
therefore predicts that if we hold the degree of projection constant, overbidding occurs in
both information conditions, but the normalized degree of overbidding (suitably defined)
is larger in common value auctions than in private value auctions.
Equilibrium strategies are mixed Overtaking the opponents, by bidding some r =
r⋆+ε, induces upward jumps in both perceived winning probability and perceived object
value, at infinitesimally small costs. If the expected payoff after bid increment is posi-
tive, the projecting bidder therefore prefers outbidding the opponents to matching their
bids. In turn, a symmetric, pure strategy profile can be an equilibrium only if it induces
zero expected payoffs. Then, however, projecting bidders can realize positive profits by
deviating to bids r < r⋆. They lose against bidders with similar valuations (probability
15Note that the projected probability of winning is discontinuous in r if the opponents play a pure strat-
egy. It jumps at r = r⋆ where one “overtakes” opponents with the same signal. The discontinuity will
disappear once we allow for mixed strategies, but the incentive to slightly outbid opponents with similar
values is robust to allowing for mixed strategies.
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ρ < 1), but they win profitably against bidders with lower valuations. This yields positive
profits with positive probability, and in turn, pure symmetric equilibria do not exist. As a
result, the type projection equilibria must be mixed if 0 < ρ < 1.
Support and skewness The lower bound of the support exceeds the BNE bid due to
loser regret and cursed value perception, given the weak strategic complementarity, and
the upper bound does not exceed the unconditional value as expected payoffs there are
negative (even for projecting bidders). Now, taking the derivative of the payoff with
respect to r (in response to σ) and solving for σ(r), we obtain for interior r ∈ (r,r)
σ(r) =
1








which implies that σ(r) is increasing in r, since Fσ(r) is increasing and Π̃
′
0(r|σ) is de-
creasing (in the relevant range). The equilibrium strategy is thus left-skewed, i.e. the
mean is left to the median. The upper bound r of the support converges to rBNE as ρ → 0
and the lower bound converges to the unconditional value Ṽ as ρ → 1.
Second-price auctions Finally, let us briefly look at second-price auctions. Due to the
second-price payment rule, the loser-regret component of projection vanishes, but the
cursed value perception continues to affect behavior. The projected expectation exhibits
a jump discontinuity at r = r⋆, where one overtakes the opponent, if the object value has a
common component (δ > 0). In such cases, bidders again perceive to benefit from over-
taking opponents, which rules out optimality of bidding one’s value and the existence
of pure equilibria. The resulting mixed equilibria are similar to their first-price counter-
parts, as illustrated in the supplementary material. In second-price private-value auctions
(δ = 0), projection equilibria are pure and bidders bid their values, as predicted by all
belief-based concepts. Since overbidding is a systematic phenomenon also in second-
price private-value auctions, even if related to the bidders’ beliefs about their opponents’
values (Cooper and Fang, 2008), this suggests that preferences relating to spite, inequity
aversion, or joy of winning are likely also behaviorally relevant in auctions.
3 Testing the qualitative predictions
I re-analyze seven experiments. Pooling data from multiple experiments reduces the risk
of misinterpreting model adequacy due to data selection and the fallacy to overfitting by
assessing predictive adequacy across experiments. Evaluating predictive adequacy ad-
ditionally clarifies to which degree the results obtained here may be helpful in (future)
analyses of different data sets. Finally, pooling auctions under varying information con-
ditions (IPV, APV and CV) allows me to examine robustness to real-world conditions
which tend to be hybrid (Haile, 2001; Goeree and Offerman, 2002).
The data sources are listed in Table 1. These data sets form exactly the union of
the data sets analyzed in the most influential studies of bidding behavior, Goeree et al.
(2002b), Bajari and Hortacsu (2005), Eyster and Rabin (2005), and Crawford and Iriberri
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(2007).16 The repetitive re-analysis of these data sets indicates consensus on their ade-
quacy to study bidding behavior, and re-analyzing these very data sets implies that if data
selection influences the results, it would be in favor of existing theories.
As all of these data sets are well known and frequently analyzed, I skip an overly
detailed discussion. The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of behav-
ior in relation to the novel predictions derived above, based on estimates of the bidding
functions and of the first three moments of the normalized bids. Specifically, I test the
predicted independence of normalized strategies of signals x and the predictions of type
projection about overbidding, mixedness and skewness. Throughout, I distinguish ex-
perienced subjects and inexperienced subjects. This comparison complements existing
studies, which analyze either inexperienced subjects (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) or ex-
perienced ones (most other studies). In particular, depth of reasoning and rationality of
expectations are argued to vary with experience (e.g. Crawford and Iriberri, 2007): initial
behavior (inexperienced subjects) is intuitively closer to level-k and converged behavior
(experienced subjects) is intuitively closer to rational expectations and equilibrium. Fol-
lowing Crawford and Iriberri (2007), a subject is called “inexperienced” during the first
five auctions, and by inversion, “experienced” during the last five auctions (of some 20
auctions in a session).17
The APV and CV auctions are exactly as defined above, and the IPV auctions are
based on private values v = Xi distributed as Xi ∼ U [0,30] or Xi ∼ U [0,28.3]. In the
APV and CV auctions analyzed, the BNE bids are b(xi) ≈ xi − ε and b(xi) ≈ xi − 2ε/n,
i.e. bidders are predicted to shade bids by absolute amounts in relation to signals (as
discussed above). To evaluate this prediction, I estimate bidding functions b=α ·ε+β ·x,
testing the nulls α < 0 and β = 1. The “signal bandwidth” ε is constant within treatments,
i.e. its inclusion is econometrically irrelevant, but controlling for ε facilitates comparisons
across treatments. In the IPV auctions, both BNE and cursed equilibrium predict bids
b(x) = (n−1)/n · x and CRRA predicts b(x) = (n−1)/(n−1+α) · x for α ∈ (0,1], see
Cox et al. (1985). That is, equilibrium bids are fixed fractions of signals, to which I refer
as relative bid shading. Here, I estimate b = α+β · x to test the predictions that α = 0
and β < 1. In all cases, I include subject-level random effects, bootstrap p-values,18 and
report significance at two levels: 0.05 and 0.005. The former is standard, and the latter
implements the Bonferroni correction assuming 10 simultaneous tests across treatments
and models, which is about adequate per level of experience.
Table 2, column “Bidding function”, provides the estimated bidding functions. In
16Two of data sets analyzed in some of these studies, namely Goeree et al. (2002b) and Avery and Kagel
(1997), are examined in the supplementary material, as they are “non-standard” (exhibiting either discrete
signals or signals conditional on object value are not independent) and hence they cannot be discussed in a
unified manner alongside the other auction experiments listed in Table 1.
17In common value auctions, in particular, behavior has not converged after five auctions, which pre-
cludes me from using all observations from the sixth auction on in the analysis of experienced subjects.
In turn, behavior is independent of time during the first five auctions and during the last five auctions,
respectively (as shown in the supplementary material), indicating that these partitions of the data set meet
the time invariance assumed in the analysis.
18The bootstrap accounts for the panel structure of the data. Specifically, the data set is resampled
R = 10.000 times at the subject level (reflecting the panel structure of the data). To define the p-value
of the null hypothesis that some statistic s is zero, let sb denote its value in sample b and let s0 denote its










b : |sb−s| ≥ |s0|
}
, where
s is the mean of (sb) and R the number of samples. Other p-values are defined analogously.
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Table 1: Data sources
Inexperienced Experienced
Format Source Values Signals #Subj #Obs #Subj #Obs
First price, Kagel and Levin (2002) v = X0 Xi|X0 ∼U [s± ε] 51 255
common value Kagel and Levin (1986) v = X0 Xi|X0 ∼U [s± ε] 49 237




Kagel et al. (1987) v = Xi Xi|X0 ∼U [x0 ± ε] 42 210 42 210
First price, Dyer et al. (1989) v = Xi Xi ∼U [0,30] 18 180 18 180
Independ. private Kagel and Levin (1993) v = Xi Xi ∼U [0,28.3] 10 50 10 100
Experiments on non-standard auctions (see supplementary material)
First price,
Independ. private
Goeree et al. (2002b) v = Xi Xi discrete 80 400 80 400
Second price,
Common value
Avery and Kagel (1997) v = X1 +X2 Xi ∼U [1,4] 23 115 23 115
Note: The data for inexperienced subjects are mostly from Crawford and Iriberri (2007). In most rounds
of Dyer et al. (1989) and Kagel and Levin (1993), the subjects played two auction markets simultaneously.
Focusing on the first and last five rounds they played, we mostly have ten observations per subject. Due to
bankruptcies in CV auctions, there are not always five observations per subject.
APV and CV auctions, the coefficient of signal x differs significantly from 1 in only one
of the twelve treatments (at α = .05), which is well within the limits of chance. In IPV
auctions, intercept α is insignificantly different from zero in all cases, suggesting that
subjects indeed make relative reductions. The estimated parameters are also economi-
cally insignificant, i.e. small in relation to the range of signals.
Result 1 (Independence of x). In APV and CV auctions normalized bids r := (b− x)/ε
are independent of x, and in IPV auctions normalized bids r := b/x are independent of x.
From now on, I focus on analyzing these normalized bids, i.e. r = (b− x)/ε in APV
and CV auctions and r = b/x in IPV auctions. As above, r represents the inverted degree
of bid shading.19 Values close to 0 in APV and CV auctions, or close to 1 in IPV auctions,
indicate zero bid shading. Figure 2 illustrates the distributions across conditions.
Next I test if the normalized bid distributions are unimodal. The level-k theory pre-
dicts multiple modes, which would require finite mixture modeling in the econometric
analysis, as opposed to random effects models here and mixed logit models below. The
kernel density estimates in Figure 2 suggest unimodality, and as econometric test I esti-
mate finite mixture models with up to three components. Each component is character-
ized by a mean normalized strategy, a between-subject variance regarding the subjects
making up the component, and a within-subject variance to capture individual random-
ization. The details are relegated to the supplementary material, as the impression given
by the histograms is confirmed: the bid distributions are unimodal, in the sense that sec-
ondary components (modes) are significant in only 2 of 18 treatments.
19The lower the normalized bid, the higher the degree of bid shading. For example, in APV and CV
auctions, with r = −0.4, subjects bid 0.4 · ε less than their signal, r = 0 indicates bidding one’s signal,
r =−2/n is the BNE strategy in APV auctions, and r =−1 is the BNE strategy in CV auctions.
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Table 2: Bidding functions and moments of normalized bids in first-price auctions (with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses)
Inexperienced subjects Experienced subjects
Degree of Standard Deviation Degree of Standard Deviation
Condition Bidding function Overbidding within Ss between Ss Skewness Bidding function Overbidding within Ss between Ss Skewness
Independent private values, First price (DKL89, KL93)



















































Affiliated private values, First price (KHL87)



































Common value auctions, First price (KL86)







































































Notation: b is the bid, x is the signal, ε is the signal bandwidth in APV and CV auctions
Normalized bids: The normalized bids are r = (b− x)/ε in APV and CV auction and r = b/x in IPV auctions
Degree of overbidding is the difference between the mean normalized bid and the normalized equilibrium bid (BNE without risk aversion), it is estimated controlling for subject-level random
effects (“between-subject standard deviation”). The within- and between-subject standard deviations refer to the distribution of normalized bids
Skewness: Skewness of the normalized bids after controlling for subject-level random effects (i.e. skewness of the errors in the regressions of normalized bids on intercept).
Experience: Subjects are “inexperienced” in their first five auctions and “experienced” in their last five auctions.
Asterisks indicate the bootstrapped p-values (see Footnote 18) of the null hypotheses that the respective parameters are either 1 (in case of the coefficients of x in APV and CV auctions, which are
predicted to be 1) or 0 (in all other cases). “⋆⋆” indicates p-values less than .005, and “⋆” indicates p-values between .005 and .05. The lower threshold .005 implements the Bonferroni correction
for multiple testing across treatments (for around 10 treatments per level of experience).
Figure 2: Distribution of normalized bids across information conditions (experienced
bidders; distributions for inexperienced bidders are similar and provided in the appendix)
(a) APV: N = 6,w = 12






(b) CV: N = 5−7,w = 12,18









(c) IPV (DKL89): N = 3





Result 2 (Unimodality). Across information conditions and experience levels, bid distri-
butions are unimodal (falsifying level-k). Secondary components are either insignificant
(16 of 18 treatments) or contain less than 10 percent of the subjects (2 of 18 treatments).
In the first-price auctions, normalized BNE bids are r =−1 in CV auctions, r =−2/n
in APV auctions, and r = (n−1)/n in IPV auctions. In Table 2, the difference between
normalized observed bid and normalized BNE bid is called “degree of overbidding”. The
degree of overbidding is significantly positive in 15 out of 18 cases (at α= .005), i.e. sub-
jects overbid consistently. Projection also predicts that subjects overbid more in CV auc-
tions than in APV auctions. This can be studied by comparing KL86’s CV auctions and
KHL87’s APV auctions, as they implement common values and affiliated private values
in otherwise equivalent conditions: signal bandwidths ε are similar, numbers of bidders n
are similar, and even experimental instructions and logistics are similar. The econometric
approach is to regress the degree of overbidding on the information condition (APV or
CV), controlling for subject-level random effects and bootstrapping p-values. Table 2
already shows that the degrees of overbidding are always below 0.2 in APV auctions and
mostly above 0.3 in CV auctions, i.e. substantially higher. The regression results strongly
confirm this impression (see Table 9 in the appendix): Across conditions and experience
levels, the degree of overbidding is higher in CV auctions (5 of 6 times at α = .005).
Result 3 (Overbidding). Subjects overbid and more so in CV auctions than in APV auc-
tions, confirming the predictions of ρ-TPE.
Regarding the second moments of bids, projection predicts mixed equilibria, i.e. posi-
tive within-subject variances. I test this by verifying if within-subject variance is constant
as subjects gain experience, using regression models with different within-subject vari-
ances for the two levels of experience. I test the null that variance is constant in multiple
ways, either holding the conditions such as number of bidders N or signal bandwidth w
constant, or pooling the data and then controlling for N or w, but the impression of Table 2
(column “Standard deviation within Ss”) is very robust: the within-subject variance does
not change as subjects gain experience. This holds true both in treatment-wise compar-
isons when they are possible, noting that treatment parameters in some experiments are
changed as subjects gain experience, and after pooling treatments. Between the 13 tests I
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Table 3: Stylized facts in relation to the models’ predictions
Empirical Theoretical prediction
Observation Exp payoff Risk aversion Cursed Eq Level-k Type projection
Distribution Unimodal × × × ×
Overbidding PV Yes × ×
Overbidding CV Yes × (×) ×
Rel. Overbidding CV>PV × (×) ×
Randomization Yes ×
Skewness PV Left ×
Skewness CV Right
Note: The predictions refer to level-k for expected payoffs or to the BNE assuming either expected payoffs,
risk aversion (CRRA), cursedness, or type projection. Level-k predictions reflect the standard assumption
that level-0 bidders randomize uniformly given their actual knowledge (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Nagel,
1995). Crawford and Iriberri (2007) analyze a model where level-0 bidders randomize uniformly around
their opponents’ values. This model predicts overbidding in CV auctions, as I indicate using parentheses.
made (Table 10 in appendix), there is exactly one significant relation for either direction
at the .05 level, and none at the .005 level suggested by the Bonferroni correction.
Result 4 (Randomization). The within-subject variance is highly robust to experience,
suggesting subjects randomize strategically and corroborating the prediction of ρ-TPE.
Regarding the third moments of bids, the histograms in Figure 2 suggest that the
overall distributions are left-skewed in private value auctions (both IPV and APV), while
skewness may be inverted in CV auctions. To test the hypothesized skewness of (in-
dividual) bidding functions, I estimate the skewness of the errors when regressing the
normalized bids on the intercept controlling for subject-level random effects. These es-
timates, reported in Table 2 in column “Skewness”, confirm the impression of Figure 2:
Skewness is mostly significant, at least at p = .05, and if it is significant, then toward
left-skewness in PV auctions and toward right-skewness in CV auctions.
Result 5 (Skewness). Bids are left-skewed in private value auctions (confirming the pre-
diction of ρ-TPE) and right-skewed in common-value auctions (contradicting all models).
Table 3 summarizes the relation of the predictions of the best-known models of bid-
ding to the (empirical) Results 2–5. The predictions of the existing concepts are well-
known and therefore not explicitly derived.20 Type projection explains all observations
that existing concepts explain, and in addition it explains observations that existing con-
cepts do not explain. Specifically, type projections explains overbidding as well as the
existing concepts in conjunction, and it uniquely explains most observations on the higher
moments (randomization and skewness).
20BNE for expected payoffs by definition does not predict overbidding, risk aversion (CRRA) predicts
overbidding in private value auctions, and cursed equilibrium predicts overbidding in common value auc-
tions. All these concepts predict pure equilibria, which explains neither randomization nor skewness. For
detailed discussion on the existing concepts and on level-k, let me refer to Crawford and Iriberri (2007).
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4 Structural analysis
As shown in the previous section, type projection equilibrium captures bidding in auc-
tions substantially better than existing models. This yields the joint hypothesis that (i)
type projection captures biases in computation of expected payoffs and (ii) equilibrium
captures the beliefs of subjects. I will refer to (i) as a statement about the payoff structure
and to (ii) as a statement about the belief structure. A structural analysis allows me to
disentangle these statements and thus to clarify whether the apparent adequacy of type
projection simply follows from an actually inadequate assumption of equilibrium beliefs.
In this analysis, I allow for all of the standard payoff structures (expected payoff, CRRA,
cursedness, projection) and all standard belief structures.
Obviously, it is possible to combine any belief structure with any payoff structure.
Indeed, previous analyses examined a fairly large variety of combinations, but unfortu-
nately with little overlap between studies,21 showing mainly that the identified payoff
structure depends on the assumed belief structure and vice versa. This relates to analyses
of choice under risk, where identification of utility functions and probability weighting
depends on the assumed model of stochastic choice, see e.g. Hey (2005), Blavatskyy and
Pogrebna (2010), and Wilcox (2011). Thus, to reliably analyze the payoff structure, we
have to relax the assumptions on belief formation as far as possible—to let the data speak
for itself. Next, I describe how I achieve this generalization, using a novel belief model,
and how I address potential concerns associated with using a general belief model.
4.1 Econometric specification
All concepts but type projection equilibrium predict pure strategies and thus fit the obser-
vations only if we allow for stochastic choice (i.e. “errors”). To not rule out these models
right away, I allow for errors due to “logistic” perturbations of utilities. Given strategic
beliefs σ̃−i and payoff structure Π̃, i.e. some function mapping actions r ∈ R and beliefs

















Logit implies that the higher the expected payoff of an action, the higher its probability,
with precision ranging from λ = 0 (uniform randomization) to infinity (best response).
As for belief structures σ̃−i, the existing literature distinguishes mainly between “equi-
librium beliefs” (rational expectations), “level-k beliefs” (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007),
and “Nash beliefs”. By Nash belief, I refer to the belief that opponents play the BNE
strategies for the respective payoff structure, as usually assumed in structural analyses of
21Goeree et al. (2002b) examine equilibrium beliefs in conjunction with risk aversion (and logit errors).
Eyster and Rabin (2005) examine cursed equilibrium, i.e. Nash beliefs in conjunction with cursed payoffs
(and behavioral errors). Crawford and Iriberri (2007) show that level-k beliefs fit better than Nash beliefs
in private and common value auctions, assuming either expected or cursed payoffs and logit errors. Bajari
and Hortacsu (2005) show that Nash beliefs with behavioral errors fit about as well as equilibrium beliefs
with logit errors (in the sense that the differences are insignificant). That is, the only model considered by
two studies is equilibrium beliefs with logit errors (Goeree et al., 2002b; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2005).
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empirical auctions. Note the subtle difference between “equilibrium beliefs” and “Nash
beliefs”: bidders with so-called equilibrium beliefs have rational expectations and antic-
ipate errors of opponents, while bidders with Nash beliefs do not anticipate errors.
A model containing these belief structures as special cases obtains if we allow bidders
to believe their opponents play a quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995, QRE)22 and to logit respond with their own, presumably higher precision. That is,
bidders κ-logit respond to a λ-QRE. I refer to this model as asymmetric QRE (AQRE).
Note the minor but important difference to asymmetric logit equilibrium (Weizsäcker,
2003), where all precisions are common knowledge, while AQRE players believe their
opponents simply play the QRE with precision λ and do not acknowledge that κ 6= λ.
Definition 2. Given a payoff structure Π̃, a strategy profile σ is a
• λ-QRE if all bidders i ∈ N choose σi = Logiti(σ−i|Π̃,λ)
• (κ,λ)-AQRE if there exists a λ-QRE σ′ such that σi = Logiti(σ′−i|Π̃,κ)
AQRE nests rational expectations for κ= λ, Level-1 for λ= 0, Nash beliefs for λ=∞,
and allows for a continuum in-between these extremes. Thus, AQRE is flexible enough to
let the data speak for itself, and in addition, it is parsimonious, nesting the three models
by adding just one parameter. There are two difficulties associated with using AQRE.
One is that the underlying QRE needs to be computed explicitly. The insight of Bajari
and Hortacsu (2005) allowing to avoid the fixed point computation underlying QRE—
by exploiting rational expectations and using observed behavior as beliefs—is infeasible
as observed behavior forms an AQRE and subjects do not have rational expectations.
Hence, the QRE needs to be computed explicitly, but computing a QRE of an auction is
not straightforward, as mixed bidding functions are rather complex. Thanks to the above
result that subjects’ strategies are one-dimensional, AQRE is computationally feasible
using current technology, however.23 That is, Result 1 allows us to compute QRE and
AQRE, which in turn endogenizes the belief assumptions made in the literature.
The probably more prominent difficulty with using (A)QRE relates to the concern
that a sufficiently generalized QRE can fit everything (see e.g. Haile et al., 2008). I ad-
dress this concern in two ways. On the one hand, I will report on robustness checks using
the best known alternative belief models, namely level-k (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Nagel,
1995), cognitive hierarchy (Camerer et al., 2004) and noisy introspection (Goeree and
Holt, 2004). Secondly, I will explicitly verify the fallacy to overfitting by examining pre-
dictive adequacy. To be safe, I evaluate descriptive, predictive and inferential adequacy
of models. Descriptive adequacy quantifies goodness-of-fit in-sample and is measured
by Bayes information criterion (Schwarz, 1978) using the number of subjects as num-
ber of observations. Predictive adequacy (Hey et al., 2010) measures the reliability of
22QRE is the standard model in behavioral game theory, and successfully captures behavior in e.g. the
centipede game (Fey et al., 1996), the traveler’s dilemma (Capra et al., 1999), public goods games (Goeree
et al., 2002a), monotone contribution games (Choi et al., 2008), and beauty contests (Breitmoser, 2012).
23For illustration, consider a grid with 100 different normalized bids over which the bidders randomize.
In an auction with 5 bidders and say 100 possible signals, evaluating the payoff function is possible by
simulation using quasi-random numbers, which in turn can be implemented in a massively parallel manner
on a GPU (which is reasonably standard, see e.g. Breitmoser, 2012). On top of it, finding the fixed point for
the distribution over 100 normalized bids is possible, but finding the fixed point for 100×100 probabilities
(allowing for logistic errors) is not yet possible using “regular” computers.
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predictions across experiments, by fitting the parameters to one information condition,
using the estimate to predict the remaining data, evaluating the likelihood, and rotating
such that all data sets are used as training data.24 Structural analysts of empirical auc-
tions are concerned mainly about inferential adequacy, i.e. the accuracy of the object
values inferred from bids (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2005). I use an out-of-sample version
where, given parameters estimated using one data set, the out-of-sample predictions for
the other treatments are computed and then, for each bid in these treatments, the posterior
expectation of the underlying signal is evaluated. This conditional expectation is called
inferred signal. The inferential adequacy is the mean absolute deviation (MAD) to the
actual signals. The appendix contains formal definitions, and the supplementary material
reports on robustness checks using the mean squared deviation (MSD).25
The remaining details of the specification are standard and relegated to Appendix A.
Significance is reported exactly at the levels used above, 0.05 for “weak” significance
and 0.005 to reflect the Bonferroni correction, based on bootstrapped likelihood ratio test
statistics and using nested or non-nested Vuong tests, as appropriate. I control for subject
heterogeneity by allowing that all parameters are distributed randomly across subjects
(“mixed logit”), which adequately captures the unimodality of bids. The appendix spec-
ifies the (standard) likelihood function and the numerical approach to its maximization.
4.2 Which payoff structure is most adequate?
The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, I analyze which payoff structure captures
behavior most adequately under the general belief model AQRE, i.e. nesting the three
standard models: rational expectations, naive beliefs, and Nash beliefs.
Question 1. Allowing for all of the standard belief structures, which payoff structure
captures bidding: expected payoffs, risk aversion, cursedness, or projection?
The results, presented in Table 4, are rather clear-cut: Type projection generally is
most adequate, corroborating the compatibility with the stylized facts, and in most cases
the differences to the other payoff structures are highly significant. The descriptive ade-
quacy of projection shows that a fairly constant degree of projection fits behavior across
conditions. its predictive adequacy shows that the fit is robust, i.e. the estimated degree
of projection is robust, indicating that type projection may be a behavioral primitive.
Predictive adequacy also clarifies the striking differences to the other concepts. Both
risk aversion and cursedness significantly improve on expected payoffs descriptively (i.e.
in-sample) but fail to consistently improve on it predictively (out-of-sample). Their be-
havioral content in relation to expected payoffs is not robust. In turn, type projection
24The tendency to distinguish descriptive and predictive adequacy is a rather recent development in
analyses of decision-theoretic models (Wilcox, 2008; Hey et al., 2010), learning models (Erev and Roth,
1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Tang, 2003; Ho et al., 2008), and simple games (Blanco et al., 2011; Shapiro
et al., 2014). I am not aware of existing analyses in Bayesian games in general or auctions in particular.
25Briefly, both descriptive and predictive adequacy are likelihood based, with the BIC representing a
correction for the amount of overfitting induced by using free parameters (Schwarz, 1978). Predictive
adequacy by definition avoids free parameters in the evaluation stage. These likelihood-based measures
are attractive due to their well-known limiting properties (consistency and efficiency). The usage of MAD
and MSD in inferential adequacy complements these measures and follows Bajari and Hortacsu (2005).
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Table 4: Analysis of the payoff structure (for all measures of adequacy: less is better)
(a) Inexperienced subjects (first five auctions), aggregated across conditions (IPV, APV, CV)
Adequacy Exp Payoff Risk Aversion Projection Cursedness
Descriptive 4108 ≫ 3911 ≫ 3742 ≪ 3967
Predictive 4261 ≈ 4203 ≫ 4034 ≪ 4449
Inferential 2226 ≪ 2636 ≫ 1759 ≪ 2110
Average (λ,κ,α) 45,0.12 0.39,15,0.34 11,3.1,0.44 20,1.3,0.73
(b) Experienced subjects (last five auctions), aggregated across conditions (IPV, APV, CV)
Adequacy Exp Payoff Risk Aversion Projection Cursedness
Descriptive 4005 ≫ 3573 ≫ 3377 ≪ 3805
Predictive 4069 ≫ 3799 > 3686 ≪ 4200
Inferential 4460 > 4004 ≈ 3498 ≈ 3650
Average (λ,κ,α) 47,0.05 0.34,14,0.24 18,3.3,0.48 130,0.21,0.78
Note: The row “Average (λ,κ,α)” lists the average estimates of precision λ, belief parameter κ (of AQRE),
and degree α of risk aversion/cursedness/projection (depending on model). Significance at 0.05 is indicated
by <,>, and significance at 0.005 is indicated by ≪,≫ (which implements the Bonferroni correction).
does not only yield higher predictive adequacy than expected payoffs for both inexperi-
enced and experienced subjects—it fits better out-of-sample than expected payoffs does
in-sample. Thus, type projection is of robust relevance in bidding. The results on infer-
ential adequacy are similar, though not quite significant in all cases.
Result 6. Allowing for the general belief structure, type projection is the dominant model
of the payoff structure. It is most adequate by all measures, for both experienced and
inexperienced subjects, and it uniquely improves on expected payoffs out-of-sample.
4.3 How are beliefs formed?
Based on these results, let us use type projection as payoff structure and identify the
belief structure. Besides equilibrium (QRE) and asymmetric QRE, I will consider noisy
introspection (NI, Goeree and Holt, 2004), cognitive hierarchy (CHM, Camerer et al.,
2004), and level-k (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995), see Appendix A.
Question 2. Given the identified model of the payoff structure (type projection), which
belief structure captures bidding?
First, to provide context, let me briefly review existing results. In small normal-form
games with dominated strategies, subjects exhibit low depth of reasoning: They do not
choose dominated strategies but fail to take into account that opponents reason similarly
(Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Weizsäcker, 2003; Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008). In
games without dominated strategies, in particular in games with unique mixed equilibria,
equilibrium beliefs are most adequate (Goeree et al., 2003; Brunner et al., 2011). In
large normal form games, beliefs tend to be in-between these extremes: subjects may
underestimate the precision of others, but not as extremely as level-1 (Goeree et al.,
2002a; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Breitmoser, 2012). This can be captured by
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Table 5: Analysis of the belief structures (for all measures of adequacy: less is better)
(a) Inexperienced subjects (first five auctions), aggregated across conditions (IPV, APV, CV)
Adequacy Level-k CHM QRE AQRE NI
Descriptive 3760 ≈ 3762 ≈ 3771 > 3742 ≈ 3751
Predictive 4091 > 4014 ≪ 4082 > 4034 ≈ 4035
Inferential 1962 ≪ 2210 ≫ 2110 ≫ 1759 ≪ 2116
Average (λ,κ,ρ) 43,4.8,0.44 47,7.1,0.44 45,0.4 11,3.1,0.44 16,0.54,0.5
(b) Experienced subjects (last five auctions), aggregated across conditions (IPV, APV, CV)
Adequacy Level-k CHM QRE AQRE NI
Descriptive 3404 ≪ 3435 ≈ 3406 > 3377 ≪ 3454
Predictive 3644 ≪ 3697 ≫ 3599 ≪ 3686 ≫ 3609
Inferential 3370 ≪ 3565 ≈ 3508 ≈ 3498 > 3251
Average (λ,κ,ρ) 29,11,0.42 29,8,0.42 52,0.45 18,3.3,0.48 16,0.62,0.52
Note: The row “Average (λ,κ,ρ)” lists the average estimates of precision λ, belief parameter κ (depending
on model), and degree ρ of projection (depending on model). Significance at 0.05 is indicated by <,>,
and significance at 0.005 is indicated by ≪,≫.
e.g. AQRE with κ> λ> 0 and NI with 1> κ> 0. Auctions are similarly large games, and
following Goeree et al. (2002b) equilibrium beliefs are adequate (i.e. QRE). Bajari and
Hortacsu (2005) show that equilibrium beliefs are about as adequate as Nash beliefs.26
The results of the current analysis, provided in Table 5, largely corroborate these
observations. To organize the results, let us take the unique one-parametric model (QRE)
as benchmark and ask which of the two-parametric models improve on it consistently.
As for inexperienced subjects, the only model that improves on QRE consistently (by all
three measures) is AQRE, but in two of the three cases, the significance of the differences
is not robust to the Bonferroni correction. Thus, I say that AQRE weakly improves on
QRE for inexperienced subjects. As for experienced subjects, no model consistently
improves on QRE, which has the highest predictive adequacy and thus fits most robustly.
Result 7. Inexperienced subjects underestimate the precision of others, which is captured
best by AQRE. Beliefs approach rational expectations (QRE) as subjects gain experience.
Thus, in line with the literature, inexperienced bidders exhibit comparably noisy be-
liefs (relating to Crawford and Iriberri, 2007), though level-k is not the most adequate
model, which confirms the observations that bid distributions are unimodal (Result 2).
Experienced bidders are well described holding equilibrium beliefs (relating to Goeree
et al., 2002b, and Bajari and Hortacsu, 2005). To illustrate the goodness-of-fit, Figure 3
plots the predicted densities of QRE with projection over the histograms of normalized
bids. These plots refer to inexperienced subjects; the respective plots for experienced
subjects are similar and provided as supplementary material.
26In turn, Crawford and Iriberri (2007) show that for a specific assumption of level-0 behavior and
assuming expected payoffs, level-k models may fit better than equilibrium beliefs.
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Note: The histograms plot the normalized bids for each information condition in standard auctions (see
Table 1), always aggregated across treatments, focusing on inexperienced subjects. On top, the solid line
depicts the predicted choice probabilities of QRE with projection, equally averaged across treatments.
4.4 Are subjects additionally risk averse?
Subjects may be projecting or cursed in addition to being risk averse. Potentially, the
focus on determining the “single best” explanation, which shapes the existing literature
and to some extent also the present analysis up to this point (we do allow for generalized
belief structures), is inadequate and misrepresents behavior. This possibility is examined
in this third analytical step.
Question 3. Is a generalized payoff structure allowing for risk aversion besides type
projection or cursedness more adequate than plain type projection?
On a qualitative basis, type projection explains overbidding in private value auctions
as well as risk aversion, and in addition it explains randomization and skewness. This
captures behavior more comprehensively both in-sample and out-of-sample, suggesting
that risk aversion may be behaviorally insignificant once we consider type projection
behaviorally relevant. However, since risk aversion explains overbidding in private value
auctions and cursedness explains overbidding in common value auctions, the notion that
subjects are both, risk averse and cursed, may adequately capture behavior.
The analytical approach is as before. Based on the above results, I focus on equi-
librium beliefs; robustness checks are provided as supplementary material. The results,
reported in Table 6, are clear and can be summarized succinctly. The in-sample differ-
ences are small and insignificant, i.e. type projection describes behavior comprehensively
and does not miss out on any aspect captured by the other models despite its relative par-
simony. This corroborates its compatibility with the stylized facts compiled above, see
Table 3. The predictive adequacy significantly improves with type projection on its own,
indicating that its parsimony indeed improves robustness. Augmenting type projection
by risk aversion improves the inferential adequacy when subjects are experienced, which
may be of relevance in empirical work.27
27One caveat is that large and diverse data sets are required to reliably estimate both degree of projection
and degree of risk aversion (risk aversion on its own lacks inferential adequacy). This seems to be the
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Table 6: Evaluation of models with multiple motives
(a) Inexperienced subjects (first five auctions), aggregated across conditions (IPV, APV,
CV)
Adequacy Proj + RA Projection Curse + RA
Descriptive 3772 ≈ 3771 ≈ 3790
Predictive 4160 ≫ 4082 ≪ 4235
Inferential 2127 ≈ 2110 ≪ 2312
Average pars 46,0.37,0.88 45,0.4 20,0.73,0.64
(b) Experienced subjects (last five auctions), aggregated across conditions (IPV, APV, CV)
Adequacy Proj + RA Projection Curse + RA
Descriptive 3378 ≈ 3406 ≈ 3424
Predictive 3732 ≫ 3599 ≪ 3762
Inferential 2916 ≪ 3508 ≈ 3209
Average pars 67,0.31,0.71 52,0.45 68,0.72,0.46
Note: The tables report results for QRE with projection. The order of average parameters is (λ,ρ,α) for
“Proj + RA”, (λ,ρ) for “Projection”, and (λ,χ,α) for “Curse + RA”, where λ is the QRE-precision, and
α,ρ,χ are the degrees of risk aversion, projection, and cursedness, respectively. Significance at 0.05 is
indicated by <,>, and significance at 0.005 is indicated by ≪,≫.
Table 7: Average precision and degrees of projection as a function of experience
CV 1st price CV 2nd price APV IPV Pooled
λ ρ λ ρ λ ρ λ ρ λ ρ
Inexperienced 1.7 1 30 0.58 18 0.3 26 0.42 45 0.4
Experienced 8.2 0.28 45 0.65 41 0.46 52 0.45
Note: Given the estimates for QRE with projection, the tables lists mean precision λ and mean degree of
projection ρ. The underlying distributions are log-normal and truncated normal, respectively.
Result 8. Complementing type projection by risk aversion does not improve model ade-
quacy in-sample (descriptively) or out-of-sample (predictively), but it improves inferen-
tial adequacy for experienced subjects.
4.5 Is the projection bias robust to experience?
Finally, let us look at the differences between inexperienced and experienced subjects.
The main purpose is to evaluate whether the projection bias possibly disappears as sub-
jects gain experience, which would limit its relevance for applied work.
Question 4. Are projection bias, precision, and heterogeneity robust to experience?
Table 7 presents the means of precision and degree of projection for each informa-
tion condition, separately for inexperienced and experienced subjects. In all information
case in the present analysis but is unlikely to be satisfied in field work. Another caveat is that the models
considered here are estimated by maximum likelihood, and thus inferential adequacy is a side effect. If
inferential adequacy is the main objective, a different estimator may be appropriate.
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Table 8: Analysis of significance of subject heterogeneity
(a) Inexperienced subjects (first five auctions)
Adequacy Homog. Heterog.
Descriptive 3893 ≫ 3771
Predictive 4075 ≈ 4082
Inferential 2108 ≈ 2110
Average pars 17,0.43 45,0.4
(b) Experienced subjects (last five auctions)
Adequacy Homog. Heterog.
Descriptive 3570 ≫ 3406
Predictive 4030 ≫ 3599
Inferential 4613 ≫ 3508
Average pars 11,0.61 52,0.45
Note: The tables report results for QRE with projection, assuming either homogeneous or heterogeneous
subjects (the latter as in the model used so far and as described in Appendix A). Significance at 0.05 is
indicated by <,>, and significance at 0.005 is indicated by ≪,≫.
conditions, the mean precision increases as subjects gain experience, to the extent that
behavior almost converged to projection equilibrium without errors in private value auc-
tions. The degree of projection is on average constant, slightly increasing for private value
auctions and substantially decreasing for common value auctions. In the latter case, the
degree of projection is initially very high (ρ = 1) but declines to one of the lowest values
across conditions as subjects gain experience. The high initial value indicates that inex-
perienced subjects struggle comprehending common values, and the subjects struggling
the most actually go bankrupt in CV auctions. Bankrupt subjects are removed from the
experiment and therefore not present in the pool of experienced subjects, which slightly
biases the average degree of projection in CV auctions in relation to the other auctions.
Aside from that, the mean degree of projection is near 0.5, which indicates that type
projection is indeed a constant factor in bidding.
Next, I investigate how the extent of subject heterogeneity varies with experience.
Contrary to the heterogeneous model considered so far, I now consider the homogeneous
model where subjects are collectively described by a representative agent with “average”
precision λ and “average” degree of projection ρ. The procedure is otherwise equal to
above. The results are presented in Table 8. As for inexperienced subjects, allowing for
heterogeneity improves the goodness-of-fit descriptively (in-sample), but neither predic-
tively nor inferentially. In this case, allowing for heterogeneity induces overfitting. As
for experienced subjects, allowing for heterogeneity highly significantly improves on the
representative-agent model according to all three measures. This complements the earlier
finding that experienced subjects exhibit higher precision and rational expectations, sug-
gesting that experienced subjects understand the auctions and their opponents, enabling
them to bid according to their preferences and individual differences become visible.
Result 9. As subjects gain experience, their average precision increases, the average
degree of projection remains largely constant, and subjects exhibit heterogeneity.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduces type projection equilibrium as a model of bidding in auctions. Type
projection was an ex-ante plausible candidate to be behaviorally relevant, as it is robustly
observed in psychological research and intuitively applies to all (symmetric) Bayesian
games, such as auctions. Yet, despite the large amounts of studies dedicated to either,
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auctions in economics and projection in psychology, the only published paper suggesting
a potential link between bidding and projection appears to be Engelmann and Strobel
(2012). After deriving theoretical predictions on overbidding, mixedness and skewness, I
show that these mostly novel predictions are borne out in the data and that type projection
substantially improves on existing models such as CRRA, cursedness, and level-k, both
in-sample and out-of-sample. The previous drawback of structural auction analyses, that
results depend on the identifying assumption about strategic beliefs, is resolved using a
novel model of strategic beliefs (asymmetric QRE) nesting all models typically used.
The degree of projection, being around 0.5, is largely constant across information
conditions and robust to experience—while subjects’ beliefs approach rational expecta-
tions and their precision in maximizing utility increases with experience. Finally, type
projection provides a comprehensive explanation in the sense that complementing it by
say risk aversion or level-k does not improve model adequacy. This is compatible with the
observations that bidders exhibit loser regret rather than risk aversion (Filiz-Ozbay and
Ozbay, 2007) and that the gender differences in bidding (Casari et al., 2007; Ham and
Kagel, 2006; Chen et al., 2013; Pearson and Schipper, 2013) do not relate to differences
in risk aversion (Schipper, 2015).28 Overall, the results are consistent and clear, strongly
suggesting that type projection is a factor of behavior in auctions, and by extension in
type-symmetric Bayesian games, which suggests ample opportunity for further research.
In this regard, three points may be worth noting. First, projection likely affects be-
havior not only in auctions, but similarly in other Bayesian games with symmetric type
sets, including games where social preferences matter. In general, though, experimental
work in economics tends to attribute deviations from Nash equilibrium either to prefer-
ences, such as risk aversion or inequity aversion, or to belief asymmetry, such as level-k.
Intuitively, each of these influences affects behavior in general, but projection should not
be neglected simply because the literature focused on other concepts so far: Judging by
the psychological evidence, the relevance of projection appears to be rather universal.
Second, analysts of empirical auctions may consider projection at least alongside risk
aversion in econometric analyses of bidding. This has both a downside and an upside.
On the downside, projection equilibria are mixed and their computation may require in-
formation that analysts do not immediately have, e.g. the upper bound of values in private
value auctions. Less information is required, and some tractability is gained (see Bajari
and Hortacsu, 2005), if one is willing to neglect projection and assume “Nash beliefs”
(bidders’ beliefs are equilibrium strategies without errors). These assumptions are highly
debatable, though. My results challenge the neglect of projection, and most analyses, in-
cluding Crawford and Iriberri (2007) and above, show that subjects tend to underestimate
the precision of others, i.e. the opposite of Nash beliefs. Further on the upside, projec-
tion equilibria fit much more robustly than received models across private and common
values, which suggests that they are less prone to misspecification of the information
conditions. This is promising as many empirical auctions take place in hybrid conditions
(Haile, 2001; Goeree and Offerman, 2002). These advantages may well outweigh the
additional computational burden, but more work clearly is required.
28Indeed, as an anonymous referee pointed out, the gender differences relate to progesterone which in-
creases “social closeness” as its only other documented behavioral implication (Brown et al., 2009; Schip-
per, 2015), and social closeness seems to increase the affinity to projection (Clement and Krueger, 2002).
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Finally, Engelmann and Strobel (2012) have shown that subjects are less likely to
project if they are provided with the objective information in the best possible way. This
suggests that the fallacy to projection may be subject to policy intervention, and future
work may determine the best way of providing objective information. Further, to the de-
gree that overbidding is due to risk aversion, educating subjects does not help efficiency.
To the degree that overbidding is due to projection, educating subjects increases the ef-
ficiency in at least two ways: Subjects stop randomizing in equilibrium, which ensures
that the bidder with the highest value wins, and in cases where not just the winners pay
their bids (e.g. contests), a reduction of overbidding increases efficiency. Thus, the above
findings also have novel policy implications.
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A Appendix
A.1 Alternative behavioral concepts
Cursed equilibrium The relation to cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) has
been discussed in the Introduction: Both concepts assume that players have a mistaken
understanding of the type distribution. Given the degree of cursedness χ ∈ [0,1], cursed
players assign weight 1−χ to the Bayesian case and χ to the event that their opponents’
types are random and uninformative given the own signal. In the latter case, the oppo-
nents play the average strategy σi(a−i|ti) = ∑ t−i∈T−i Pr(t−i|ti)∏ j 6=i σ j(a j|t j), and overall,

























A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . ,σn) is a χ-cursed equilibrium if σi(·|ti) ∈ BRti(σ−i|πCursei )
for all i and ti. I am not aware of independent evidence supporting “random projection” as
in cursed equilibrium (as opposed to projection of the own type), but cursed equilibrium
appears well-suited to capture beliefs if type sets are asymmetric. Market interactions
with one-sided incomplete information as analyzed in Eyster and Rabin (2005) are a
prototypical example. In such asymmetric games, type projection appears less intuitive.
Risk aversion Cox et al. (1985, 1988) argue that a potential factor in bidding is constant

















σ j(a j|t j). (10)
CRRA utilities u(·) can equally be used to complement projection and cursedness. As it
stands, risk aversion is the leading explanation of overbidding in private value auctions,
but the more recent observations on loser regret, e.g. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) and
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007), challenge this perspective (as discussed above).
Limited depth of reasoning The concepts discussed so far have in common that they




i }. The players’
beliefs about their opponents’ strategies are taken as given. The complementary approach
is to vary the belief structure, allowing that players deviate from BNE by violating ratio-
nal expectations.29 The seminal model in this strand literature, level-k, follows Stahl and
Wilson (1995) and Nagel (1995); other belief structures are discussed below. Assum-
ing level-0 randomizes uniformly, σ0(·|ti) = 1/|Ai| for i, ti, and given a payoff structure
29Note that both cursedness and projection can equally be defined as concepts relaxing the belief struc-
ture. Above, they have been defined in terms of the payoff structure, as both Eyster and Rabin (2005) and
the above definitions emphasize that an equilibrium assumption is maintained even under cursedness and
projection (a BNE of an augmented game), while standard models of alternative belief structures (such as
level-k) emphasize the non-equilibrium character of the predicted strategy profiles.
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i }, player i has level-k depth of reasoning, k ≥ 1, if he plays
σk(·|ti)∈ BRti(σk−1−i |π̃i) for all ti. In a similar manner, level-k has been applied to auctions
by Crawford and Iriberri (2007).
A.2 Belief models
As described above, I endow all models with logistic errors. Noisy introspection (Goeree
and Holt, 2004) is a model inspired by relaxing rationalizability through allowing for
logistic errors. Each type plays a λ-logit response to the belief that his opponents play a
λ ·κ-logit response to the belief their opponents play a λ ·κ2-logit response to their belief,
and so on, using κ ∈ [0,1]. The model contains quantal response equilibrium and level-1
as special cases, for κ = 1 and κ = 0, respectively.




i }, a strategy
profile σ = (σ1, . . . ,σn) is consistent with (λ,κ)-noisy introspection if all types ti ∈ Ti of
all players i ∈ N choose σi(·|ti) = Logitti(σ1−i|π̃i,λ) with
σki (·|ti) = Logitti(σ
k+1
−i |π̃i,λ ·κk) (11)
The cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004) adapts the level-k model by as-
suming that level-k players do not play a logit response to the belief that all opponents
are level k−1, but a logit response to the belief that the opponents are at any level k′ < k
(including level-0). Players are assumed to have rational expectations about the relative
frequencies of these levels, and overall levels are assumed to have Poisson distribution
in the population. Given the Poisson distribution, let f (k) = Pr(level = k) denote the
relative frequency of level k overall (given distribution parameter κ), and define the con-
ditional probability g(k′|k) = Pr(level = k′ | level < k). The level-0 strategy is uniform
randomization, σ0(·|ti) = 1/|Ai|.





strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . ,σn) is consistent with (λ,κ)-cognitive hierarchy if all types
ti ∈ Ti of all players i ∈ N choose σ(·|ti) = ∑k≥0 f (k) ·σk(·|ti) with
σk(·|ti) = Logitti(τ
k−1





I use the parsimonious approach of Camerer et al. (2004) to capture the distribution
of levels via Poisson also to complete the level-k model. Again, f (k) = Pr(level = k)
denotes the relative frequency of level k in the population (given distribution parameter
κ), and the level-0 strategy is uniform randomization, σ0(·|ti) = 1/|Ai|.




i }, a strategy
profile σ = (σ1, . . . ,σn) is consistent with (λ,κ)-level-k if all types ti ∈ Ti of all players





A.3 Descriptive, predictive, and inferential adequacy
To be clear, let me introduce some notation. De denotes the data set associated with
experiment e, D = ∪eDe denotes the pooled data, and define D−e = D\De (the data sets
used here are listed in Table 1). Given a model, p denotes a generic parameter vector
and p⋆(D′) denotes the maximum likelihood estimate given data set D′. Finally, |p|
denotes the the dimensionality of p, |D′| denotes the number of subjects in data set D′,
and ll(p|D′) denotes the log-likelihood of the model with parameters p given data D′.
First, I measure descriptive adequacy by Bayes information criterion (Schwarz, 1978),
using the number of subjects as number of observations.




+ |p⋆(D)|/2 · log |D|
Second, I measure predictive adequacy by fitting the parameters to one information
condition, using the estimate to predict the remaining data, and rotating such that all data
sets are used as training data. The predictive adequacy contains no penalty term as in BIC,
as by definition no parameter is adjusted to the data set used in the validation stage, i.e.
no degree of freedom is used. To be aligned with the other measures, I report the absolute
values of the log-likelihoods, which implies that “less is better” for all measures.




/(m− 1) using m as
number of experiments analyzed
Finally, the inferential adequacy also is evaluated out-of-sample, but now, we infer
signals from bids rather than predicting bids from signals (following Bajari and Hortacsu,
2005). Given an observation and a set of parameters (estimated using training data),
the theoretical bidding function for the respective out-of-sample treatment is determined
and the expectation of the signal conditional on the observed bid is computed. This
conditional expectation is called inferred signal. The inferential adequacy is the mean
absolute deviation (MAD) to the actual signals. The supplementary material additionally
lists the results for the mean squared deviation (MSD), which are very similar. Formally,
let m(p|D′) denote the mean absolute deviation of inferred signals to actual signals if
inference is made using parameter vector p on data set D′.




A.4 Subject heterogeneity, likelihood function and maximization
The precision parameters λ and κ are bounded at zero and have independent gamma
distributions, whereas the degrees of risk aversion, projection and cursedness are bounded
at both 0 and 1 and have independent beta distributions. Thus, each subject is described
by a parameter vector p ∈ P with joint density f (). Using os = (os,t) to describe the
observations of subject s ∈ S at time t ∈ T , and σ(os,t | f ) as the probability of observation
os,t under density f , the individual likelihood given the observations os of subject s is





σ(os,t |p) · f (p)dp. (14)
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The predictions σ(os,t | f ) implicitly depend also on the underlying belief model, e.g. QRE
or AQRE. The integral is evaluated by simulation, using quasi random numbers, see Train
(2003) and e.g. the supplement to Bellemare et al. (2008). Aggregating across subjects,
the log-likelihood of the respective model with parameter density f is
ll( f ) = ∑
s∈S
log ls( f |os). (15)
QREs are computed using a homotopy method leaning on Turocy (2005). Parameters
are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood, sequentially applying two maximization
algorithms. Initially, I use the robust, gradient-free NEWUOA algorithm (Powell, 2006)
and I verify convergence using a Newton-Raphson algorithm. The estimates are tested by
extensive cross-analysis to ensure that global maxima are found. All parameter estimates
are provided as supplementary material.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1

































(2ε+d) · fD(d)/2, if d < 0
1− (2ε−d) · fD(d)/2, if d ≥ 0,
it follows that Ṽ =
∫ d
d ṽ(d) fD(d)dd = 0 and the BNE (for ρ = 0), the zero of Π̃
′
0(r|r⋆) in
case r = r⋆, is
ṽ(0)− rBNE = FD(0)
fD(0)
⇔ 0− rBNE = 1/2
1/2ε
⇔ rBNE =−ε.
Thus, the best response to r⋆, which solves Π̃
′









, if r < rBNE .
A-4
This implies that BR(r⋆) is weakly increasing in r⋆ (strategic complementarity) and that
(i) BR(r⋆)> r⋆ if r⋆ < r
BNE and (ii) BR(r⋆)< r⋆ if r⋆ > r
BNE .
Step 2 (Concavity) The second derivative with respect to r⋆ satisfies
d2
dr2















































∝ (1−δ) · ε+ r−2 · (2ε−|d|)≤ r+2 · |d|−3ε
which is negative if r+2 · |d| ≤ 3ε.
Thus, if r − r⋆ ∈ (d,d) and r + 2 · |d| ≤ 3ε, then dΠ̃0(r|r⋆)/dr is decreasing in r.
Critically, concavity therefore obtains if r,r⋆ ≤ Ṽ = 0. Note that this statement also holds
true for r− r⋆ = d, i.e. for the maximal r winning the auction with zero probability, if we
consider the directional derivative dr > 0.
Step 3 (Upper bound r ≤ Ṽ ) By r− r⋆ ∈ (d,d) and ṽ being non-decreasing, we know













fD(d)dd = Ṽ − r < 0,
where the (first) weak inequality follows from the assumption that ṽ is non-decreasing.
Thus, if r > Ṽ , then Π̃0(r|r⋆) < 0 in response to any r⋆ with r − r⋆ ∈ (d,d). By
corollary, the statement holds true equally in response to any mixed strategy σ. As a
result, in response to any σ, if r > Ṽ , then
Π̃ρ(r|σ) = (1−ρ)Π̃0(r|σ)+ρ(Ṽ − r)Fσ(r)< 0.
Negativity directly follows from Ṽ −r < 0 and Π̃0(r|σ)< 0 (Step 3). In turn, zero payoffs
are generally feasible by making a bid that loses with certainty, i.e. any r ≤ inf{r′|σ(r′)>
0}+ d − d, and bidding r > Ṽ is therefore not optimal in response to any σ. That is,
r := supBR(σ) for all σ.
Step 4 (Any symmetric ρ-TPE is mixed) For the purpose of contradiction, fix any ρ ∈
(0,1) and assume that a pure strategy equilibrium r⋆ exists. That is, given the expected
payoffs of bidding r in response to r⋆,






fD(d)dd +ρ · s(b,b⋆,x) (Ṽ − r)
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we assume r⋆ ∈ argmaxr Π̃ρ(r |r⋆). Now, I distinguish two cases.
Case 1: r⋆ < Ṽ . In this case, the bidder profits from the unilateral defection to r⋆+ε
for some ε > 0. For,
lim
ε→0





= ρ · [1−1/n] (Ṽ − r⋆)> 0,
which is positive since ρ > 0, n = 2, and r⋆ < Ṽ , the contradiction.
Case 2: r⋆ ≥ Ṽ . By Step 3, we can rule out r⋆ > Ṽ , implying that r⋆ = Ṽ obtains
and thus Π̃0(r⋆|r⋆) = 0 as well as Π̃ρ(r⋆|r⋆) = 0 for any ρ. Now consider the “infimal”
winning bid rinf which is the infimum of all bids that win the auction with positive prob-
ability in response to r⋆, namely rinf = r⋆+d −d. The expected payoff of bidding rinf is
zero, by d < d we obtain rinf < r⋆, and by concavity of Π̃0 for all r,r⋆ ≤ Ṽ it follows that
the bidder can profitably deviate to any r : rinf < r < r⋆, i.e. bidding r⋆ ≥ Ṽ is not optimal
in response to any r⋆ ≥ Ṽ (the contradiction).
Step 5 (Lower bound r ≥ rBNE) At the lower bound, the directional derivative with






which must be non-negative in equilibrium. Otherwise, one gains from deviating unilat-
erally toward putting probability mass on bids r < r. Thus, Π̃′0(r|σ) ≥ 0 if ρ ∈ (0,1).





= ρ(Ṽ − r)σ(r)+(1−ρ)Π̃′0(r|σ).
This directional derivative must be zero, since σ is mixed. By Step 3, Ṽ − r ≥ 0, by Step
4 (mixedness) we know r < r, and thus Ṽ − r > 0. Given σ(r) ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ (0,1), this
implies Π̃′0(r|σ) = 0 (besides σ(r) = 0). Next, I show that Π̃′0(r|σ) = 0 implies r ≥ rBNE .
For contradiction, assume r < rBNE . By Step 1, we know BR(r) > r for all r ≥ r in this
case, implying dΠ̃0(r|r)/dr > 0 for all r > r. Hence, Π̃′0(r|σ)> 0, the contradiction.
Step 6 (Left-skewness) Finally, I show that the density of any symmetric ρ-TPE strat-
egy is increasing on its support. Taking the derivative of Π̃ρ with respect r in response to







Along the support of the mixed equilibrium, Π̃′ρ(r|σ) = 0 is satisfied, implying for all
interior r ∈ (r,r),
σ(r) =
1









Here, Fσ(r) is (weakly) increasing in r by virtue of being a cumulative distribution func-
tion, Ṽ − r is decreasing in r since Ṽ is constant, and Π̃′0(r|σ) is decreasing in r by
concavity of Π0 (given r,r ≤ Ṽ ). Hence, σ(r) is increasing in r on σ’s support.
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Figure 4: First-price auctions, affiliated private values (KHL87). Inexperienced subjects
(a–b) vs. experienced subjects (c–d). Plots are histograms of r = (Bid−Signal)/ε
(a) Inexp: N = 6,ε = 6









(b) Inexp: N = 6,ε = 12













(c) Exp: N = 6,ε = 12






(d) Exp: N = 6,ε = 24








Figure 5: First-price auctions with common values (KL86), inexperienced subjects (a–d)
vs. experienced subjects(e–h). Plots are histograms of r = (Bid−Signal)/ε
(a) N = 4,ε = 6













(b) N = 7,ε = 6









(c) N = 4,ε = 12









(d) N = 7,ε = 12









(e) N = 3−4,ε = 12,18











(f) N = 5−7,ε = 12,18









(g) N = 3−4,ε = 24,30









(h) N = 5−7,ε = 24,30











Figure 6: First-price auctions with independent private values (DKL89). Inexperienced
subjects (a–c) and experienced subjects (d–f). Histograms of Bid/Signal
(a) Inexp: DKL89, N = 3





(b) Inexp: DKL89, N = 6








(c) Exp: DKL89, N = 3





(d) Exp: DKL89, N = 6







Table 9: Statistical tests of differences in the degree of overbidding and within-subject
variance between auctions with affiliated private values and common values
Degree of Overbidding Within-Subject Variance Between-Subj
Data APV CV APV CV Variance
Inexperienced, ε = 6 −0.128 ≪ 0.641 0.359 ≈ 0.341 0.246
Inexperienced, ε = 12 0.104 ≪ 0.523 0.052 ≪ 0.4 0.147
Inexperienced, all w −0.058 ≪ 0.621 0.326 ≈ 0.361 0.21
Experienced, w ≤ 18 0.062 ≪ 0.403 0.159 < 0.336 0.248
Experienced, w ≥ 24 0.179 < 0.329 0.113 ≪ 0.32 0.13
Experienced, all w 0.142 ≪ 0.357 0.15 ≪ 0.343 0.162
Description: The sole difference to Table 10 is that the comparison is between APV and CV auctions, instead of
inexperienced and experienced subjects.
Table 10: Statistical tests of the degree of overbidding and within-subject variance (with
respect to the degree of overbidding) as a function of experience
Degree of Overbidding Within-Subject Variance Between-Subj
Data Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced Experienced Variance
Independent private values auctions (DKL89, KL93)
N = 3 0.104 ≈ 0.148 0.16 ≈ 0.123 0.033
N = 5 0.08 > −0.144 0.142 < 0.36 0.077
N = 6 −0.021 < 0.036 0.164 ≈ 0.11 0.039
all N 0.05 ≈ 0.04 0.156 ≈ 0.178 0.119
all, contr. for N 0.05 ≈ 0.041 0.155 ≈ 0.179 0.103
Affiliated private values auctions (KHL87)
ε = 12 0.104 ≈ 0.062 0.051 ≈ 0.172 0.17
All data −0.058 ≪ 0.142 0.331 > 0.15 0.134
All, contr. for w 0.058 ≈ 0.04 0.192 ≈ 0.209 0.117
Common value auctions (KL86)
N ≤ 4, w ∈ {12,18} 0.538 > 0.228 0.415 ≈ 0.343 0.208
N ≤ 4, all w 0.63 ≫ 0.316 0.37 ≈ 0.363 0.233
N ≥ 5, all w 0.613 ≫ 0.389 0.344 ≈ 0.309 0.254
all N, w ∈ {12,18} 0.517 ≈ 0.404 0.397 ≈ 0.332 0.263
all N, all w 0.621 ≫ 0.359 0.357 ≈ 0.332 0.242
all N, all w, contr. for w 0.573 ≈ 0.411 0.349 ≈ 0.337 0.247
Description: The table reports the results of one set of statistical tests per row. Given the subset of data specified in column
1, two null hypotheses are simultaneously tested: (i) H0 : the degree of overbidding does not differ between inexperienced
and experienced subjects, and (ii) H0 : the residual (i.e. within-subject) variances do not differ between them. These
nulls are tested in regression models with the degree of overbidding as independent variable and the level of experience
as independent variable (without intercept). ≫,≪ indicate rejection of H0 at the .005 level and >,< indicate rejection
at .05, where the p-values are bootstrapped as described above. Considering the Bonferroni correction for the multiple
testing problem inherent in this analysis, results should be significant roughly at the .005 level. Terms such as the degree
of overbidding are used as defined above (e.g. Table 2).
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